Sunday, December 31, 2023

2023

Every year I start writing about a wrap-up of my year but I never end up finishing it. Hope this year is different. I'm starting with the most recent news, and that is I got my visa extended for 3 years. Yay!

During 2023 I have visited 4 countries: Australia, Latvia, London and my hometown in Spain. If we add layovers, that includes more countries: UAE and Poland. Surprisingly, the most complex work trip involving Japan, Latvia, London and Spain went almost perfectly. But lost my ticket back home and had to re-book one in a pinch. Thankfully everything went OK.

Work wise I believe this was a good year. I got promoted, I did a technical presentation in Japanese for the first time in my life and published my research in VirusBulletin.

Image
Presentation at VTユーザー会
Also, I was surprised at the Cyberchess conference. The event was packed with lots of interesting talk and the vibes were awesome. Contrary to the name of the conference, Cyberchess, there were no chess boards. I was surprised when I noticed the speaker present was a set of chocolates shaped with Chess pieces. I hope to drop by again soon.
Image
Cyberchess 2023

We also explored Japan on the road, the latest of the trips around Hiroshima. The roads down there were nice, and less packed with traffic lights compared to our surroundings. The sad thing is that most expressways are not free, and they are not cheap either. The alternative of using local roads is to add a couple of hours to the trip, which doesn't feel good. Fortunately there is little to complain about the roads, they are well kept.


Down to Hiroshima!

This year I have finally managed to stick to a consistent gym schedule and after half a year the results can be felt. I really dreaded visiting the gym, so it's my little victory. My in-laws frequently need help with their fruit fields in high season. Because of that we have gone whenever we had time.

Anyway, I ram out of themes to write about here. Happy holidays and happy new year!


Thursday, July 20, 2023

FantasyMW, a brazilian banking trojan

Update: Apparently this is a rebrand from an existing malware family called GoatRat and it was named as FantasyMW. More details at: https://www.opencti.net.br/goatrat-ressurge-com-um-novo-nome-fantasymw-android-banking-trojan-40dbbba8e7d9

Sample seen from MalwareHunterTeam's tweet.

The sample is written in kotlin and under a Windows host OS. This is possible to guess because the strings hint to Windows paths. At the time of the analysis the domains were not resolving. It seems to be a new or under development banking trojan, as hinted by the path strings:


C:/Users/55119/Documents/NewBankingTrojan/production/app/src/main/java/com/fuck/thepolice/MainActivity.kt 


This is not the first ITW sample of this developer. The first ITW sample was seen on 2023-06-06 13:25:28 UTC and uses a different path for development: 


C:/Users/nuke/Documents/FantasyMalware/BasicVersion/


The path differs from the latest spotted sample. Since this is a brazilian malware, I chose to dub it as Casanossolar from the package name instead of FantasyMalware. 


This malware requests accessibility permissions and overlay permissions to perform its activities. A complete list of permissions requested:


android.permission.ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE

android.permission.BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE

android.permission.INTERNET

android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS

android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE

android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED

android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW

com.fuck.thepolice.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION


The sample contains URLs pointing to a ping endpoint and an initialization URL. On initialization, the device information such as hwid, device model, manufacturer is sent to the C2. The CLIENT_ID hardcoded in each sample is sent on each ping attempt.


https://api.robodopix[.]online/devices/init

https://api.robodopix[.]online/devices/ping


It currently targets only 6 applications, but all of them are bank applications from Brazil/Portugal. It calls PackageManager.getInstalledPackages to obtain the list of installed applications. Each targeted application has a separate class for each of them with shared methods. It applies overlays to steal credentials when the user tries to access their bank application.



Complete list of targeted applications as of 2023-07-20.

  • com.nu.production
  • com.picpay
  • com.santander.app
  • com.itau.iti
  • com.c6bank.app
  • br.com.intermedium



The first versions don't feature emulator checks on startup. However the latest samples contain emulator checks on startup and attempts to detect Android x86, Android Emulators, and XPosed among others:


  • goldfish

  • ranchu

  • google_sdk

  • Emulator

  • Android SDK built for x86

  • Genymotion

  • sdk_google

  • google_sdk

  • sdk

  • sdk_x86

  • vbox86p

  • emulator


It also makes use of RootBeer to verify if there is root available on the device:




One of the first samples contains an image presumably from the developer, referring to himself as "Sicko", mentioning that you are being hacked and a identifier to purchase his malware. Reverse image search returns nothing, so it seems to be handcrafted by the author.


In in one of the first versions seen in the wild, there is a Discord webhook URL and the Discord webhook module is also present in the code. Since the latest spotted samples exclude the Discord hooks, it points to the author relying only on their backend.



There are different builds of the same code with different icons, in an attempt to deceive users to install the application in their device or be trusted.



Overall, it looks like a family still in development. I will update this post with any updates and update the sample collection as well.

IOCs


Virustotal Collection: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/collection/f5d99ff71a0048e789ed5ea16ca23c4ad6098508d90acaa3a70f2f4e5841430a

SHA256:


495cbabda9da0171af3d1d44388ff648f961b9326cc88daed173dffe519344be

aa546c11bbae2eecb9ac24facc872aedf08743363d8dd71e843bb85537b6cf52

5ed97f720d4925d87c198aeaf2ebbf6bbfc1ecd4c7f3f08d3c328ce9fee7cfcb

29f7c1e1193abd4d90bce08c6164764b765494e9904eed9bb493e010e1c4af3b

a8c03dde8bda11b848f4eee5b9e21e70bcdc9ace8c6e1bb16ee24990cba155e5


URLs:


https[:]//api.theworldismagic[.]online/devices/init

https[:]//api.theworldismagic[.]online/devices/ping

https[:]//api.robodopix[.]online/devices/init

https[:]//api.robodopix[.]online/devices/ping


Friday, June 9, 2023

MammothFraud, an eastern SMS stealer

 The malware, dubbed MammothFraud from one of the logging strings МАМОНТИЗАЦИЯ!  checks for the android.permission.CALL_PHONE permission and also that the SDK is greater than 26. If positive, it will attempt to introduce an USSD code to obtain the mobile phone number. For example, *111*0887# for the MTS RU provider. When the permissions are not granted by the user, it will prompt the user with a message to allow the requested permissions. In the list there are other telecom providers from Uzbekistan, Ukraine and Russia with USSD codes present.



A list of the permissions requested:

  • android.permission.CALL_PHONE

  • android.permission.READ_SMS

  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE

  • android.permission.SEND_SMS

  • android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS

  • android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS


In case there are active SIM cards in the device, the sample registers broadcast receivers for handling specific SMS-related events and for shutdown events. It also verifies whether the following applications are installed in the system:

  • com.idamob.tinkoff.android

  • ru.mw

  • ru.raiffeisennews

  • ru.belkacar.belkacar

  • com.carshering

  • ru.tsk.ftc.bender.qpay

  • ru.alfabank.mobile.android

  • ru.sberbankmobile


All the information is logged and sent to the following Telegram account: https://api.telegram.org/bot/bS243k2ivMi4lw2WHYEeXHEgPSQfr2/5ujbXer+5Cr+xmVU7Y7lwUTW94Rklavzu/getUpdates?offset=-1&timeout=60.

It has some available commands for sending SMS, send USSD requests, getting sent SMS, showing toasts or banning. If it receives the ban command, it will exit the application as seen on the screenshot. The screenshot also lists all the commands that can be received: sendsms|sendussd|getsms|ban|showtoast|getsentsms





{ 

"card": "", 

"limit": "100", 

"maxProfitValue": 1", 

"delay": "1

}

The sample also downloads a raw file from pastebin and at the time of the visit it showed the following content:



If it fails to fetch the URL,  it will wait until it is back online or the device has internet access.



Anti-detection measures


The sample shows a function that focuses on detecting whether the APK is running in an emulated environment or not. Before doing any more thorough checks it verifies that the sample isn’t running under QEMU by checking libc_malloc_debug_qemu.so:


If any of the following strings are found, it will return false:

  • google_sdk, emulator, Android SDK built for x86, Genymotion, unknown

  • Boards: QC_Reference_Phone

  • Brands: generic, Xiaomi

  • Product: google_sdk 



There are also checks against Build.MANUFACTURER, Build.FINGERPRINT and Build.Product. If it detects the Google in Build.BRAND, it checks for specific fingerprints:

  • :userdebug/dev-keys

  • :user/release-keys



So far, I have noticed 4 samples contacting the same telegram bot. It is safe to say that all of them are likely to be from the same authors. 


IOCs


Friday, November 11, 2022

Zanubis updates with screenshot recording

As always, IOCs and targets at the end. Previous updates of this family at: https://www.entdark.net/2022/09/zanubis-latam-banking-trojan.html

The latest Zanubis sample contains overall updates to the code. Among the most interesting ones, is that they are shifting to record the screen via the MediaProjection API and use it to send to back to the C2. The functionality is triggered via socket with the command "iniciarVnc".




The crafted video from the screen recording is stored as "RecordedVideo.mp4" in external storage:


Via accessibility is has also added code to copy text from the clipboard as well as sending keystrokes remotely. It also contains a method to simulate swipes given the start and end coordinates, with the intention of controlling the victims device:



As of recent samples, it will also send the users to a government site to check their debts on app startup:


IOCs:

SHA256: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e756e44290ccf5f9d6864444bbd9044c2345c60a0352de5724eb5928d29e0018/behavior

KEY: $%FLO032DFKSF234dsdf4RLOCMV@#

Banks targeted:

  • pe.com.banBifBanking.icBanking.androidUI
  • com.bbva.nxt_peru
  • pe.com.interbank.mobilebanking
  • com.mibanco.bancamovil
  • pe.com.scotiabank.blpm.android.client
  • com.bcp.bank.bcp
  • pe.com.bn.app.bancodelanacion
  • per.bf.desa
  • com.bcp.innovacxion.yapeapp
  • com.pe.cajasullana.cajamovil
  • pe.pichincha.bm
  • com.ripley.banco.peru
  • com.cmac.cajamovilaqp
  • com.cajahuancayo.cajahuancayo.appcajahuancayo
  • com.cmacica.prd
  • pe.cajapiura.bancamovil
  • pe.solera.tarjetaoh
  • com.alfinbanco.appclientes
  • pe.com.bancomercio.mobilebanking
  • com.bm_gnb_pe
  • com.zoluxiones.officebanking
  • pe.com.cajametropolitana.homebankingcml.cmlhomebanking
  • com.pe.cajacusco.movil
  • com.caja.myapplication
  • com.cajamaynas.cajamaynas
  • com.cajatacna.droid
  • com.appcajatrujillo
  • pe.com.tarjetacencosud.canales.mitarjetacencosud
  • pe.com.cajacentro
  • pe.com.prymera.digital.app
  • pe.com.compartamos.bancamovil
  • pe.confianza.bancamovil
  • id=com.credinkamovil.pe
  • pe.com.scotiabank.blpm.android.client.csf
  • com.efectivadigital.appclientes
  • com.qapaq.banking
  • pe.com.tarjetasperuanasprepago.tppapp
  • maximo.peru.pe
  • air.PrexPeru
  • pe.com.tarjetaw.neobank
  • com.fif.fpay.android.pe
  • com.cencosud.pe.metro
  • com.cencosud.pe.wong
  • com.tottus
  • com.pichincha.cashmanagement
  • com.binance.dev
  • com.gateio.gateio
  • com.google.android.apps.authenticator2
  • com.bbva.GEMA.global
  • pe.com.scotiabank.businessbanking
  • com.bcp.bank.tlc
  • com.scotiabank.telebankingapp
  • com.bitkeep.wallet
  • com.bitmart.bitmarket
  • com.bitcoin.mwallet
  • com.bbva.bbvawalletpe
  • com.bbva.lukita
  • cash.klever.blockchain.wallet
  • org.theta.wallet
  • com.wallet.crypto.trustapp
  • com.myetherwallet.mewwallet
  • pe.interbank.bie


Initial URL: https://mibegnon[.]com/wp-content/css/index.php

Socket C2: 5.252.178.86

C2:

  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/005/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34
  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/006/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34
  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/001/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34
  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/004/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34
  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/002/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34
  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/010/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34
  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/003/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34
  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/008/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34
  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/007/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34
  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/009/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34
  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/011/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34
  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/015/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34
  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/017/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34
  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/012/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34
  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/014/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34
  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/013/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34
  • http://001.kidz4lifeplus[.]org/016/389d3bf103aeec5039e30f1410d18fcd/inicio?tg81w=cv34


2023

Every year I start writing about a wrap-up of my year but I never end up finishing it. Hope this year is different. I'm starting with th...